Abstract-Runtime reliability analysis has proven to be a valuable technique to enhance the overall reliability of safetycritical systems. It has the potential to close the dependability gap that has been identified by Laprie. However, existing approaches suffer from either too complex and therefore errorprone input languages or from long execution time due to the state space explosion of the underlying analysis techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rising popularity of cyber-physical systems, which can be characterized as heterogeneous, large-scale embedded systems, leads to significantly more requirements to keep the system's dependability. Traditional embedded systems are developed by single companies that have a complete overview of their systems. This is not true any more for cyber-physical systems, resulting typically in a huge amount of safety requirements for cyber-physical system's subsystems. Laprie [1] called this the dependability gap. Therefore, in addition to traditional design-time analysis, new techniques to enhance reliability are required. They shall be able to cope with the adaptivity of these systems by executing at runtime. Safety-critical systems have to be designed in a way that they are capable to detect a certain amount of existent faults that may occur. Historically, this has been mainly achieved with redundancy and diagnostics. Both techniques are widely accepted and state-of-the-practice in various domains, e.g., Automation Engineering (IEC 61508 [2] ) or Automotive (ISO 26262 [3] ). Safety engineers use design-time safety analysis, e.g. fault tree analysis (FTA) or failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), to identify dangerous faults. These analyses have two major drawbacks, which hampers them from being successfully used for future cyber-physical safety systems:
• Traditional safety analyses are rather complex and cannot be used by non-safety experts. To improve the situation more intuitive development tools would be beneficially.
• Design-time safety analyses are computationally complex (usually due to state space explosion) and therefore they cannot be executed at runtime. Even though Moore's law is still valid, cyber-physical systems will be comprised of devices with only limited computing resources. However, these small devices can also be safety-critical and therefore it may be required to execute runtime reliability analyses on them. This paper presents a new approach for runtime reliability analysis that has the potential to cope with the drawbacks according to Salfner [4] . It can be integrated into modeldriven software development tools, for which we present an appropriate metamodel. Our metamodel can be used to model the required parameters of the runtime reliability analysis algorithms, which can then be generated automatically. Even though our approach also uses system resources at runtime (e.g., computing time and memory), it is efficient enought for embedded systems.
The paper is organized as follows: Sec. II compares the new approach with the related work and Sec. III introduces preliminary concepts that are required. Sec. IV introduces our approach, which will be evaluated in Sec. V accordingly. Sec. VI concludes the paper and gives an outlook on future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Reliability analysis in general is a well established research topic with an active scientific community. The most popular approach for reliability estimation is based on the use of discrete time Markov chains. Markov analyses are typically carried out offline with dedicated tools, e.g. OpenS-ESAME [5] . A system and its faults are modeled by the user and the tool calculates its overall reliability.
As these analyses are performed offline, it is possible to use sufficient computing resources to even analyze rare failure states, which has for example been done by Thomason [6] . Meedeniya et al. [7] investigated further how the required computing resources can be reduced by subsequent analyses reusing intermediate data from earlier iterations.
The approach of this paper reuses some of the presented concepts, e.g., by providing a metamodel that allows the user to create models in the problem domain. However the underlying philosophy differs greatly. The major drawback of Markov analyses is that they suffer from a state space explosion problem and therefore they can only be used for either small or abstract models. Moreover, the design of a Markov model requires extensive knowledge about the system states of the application and the transitions between these states. In contrast to that, our approach provides lightweight algorithms that are optimized for runtime efficiency, at the cost of reduced accuracy.
Another approach for reliability analysis, which promises to be more flexible than classical techniques, is the use of copulas to describe and analyze the reliability of a system with interdependent faults. According to Walter [8] , copulas are a way of specifying joint distributions, if only the marginal probabilities are known. This technique is quite popular for financial risk prediction, because it can be used to describe correlations between model elements that are not defined elsewhere in the model.
The main drawback of copulas is that they have to be parameterized in a very fine grained manner and typically the user does not possess enough information about a system and its environment to choose the correct parameters, according to Nelsen [9] . On the other hand, our approach aims at easy usability and therefore refrains from using copulas, because the risk of developing incorrect models with them cannot be neglected.
Another important area of research for this paper are common cause failures. Borcsok et al. [10] defines them as a specific type of dependent failures where multiple failures occur for the same cause. To evaluate common cause failures, two major methodologies exist. The first one is the explicit modeling of their dependencies. The second one is their implicit evaluation by the introduction of additional parameters into the overall system reliability analysis. The most popular representative of this methodology is the β-factor model [10] . This paper follows the first methodology, by introducing a metamodel to explicitly model dependencies, because then it is possible to enrich the system model with expert knowledge.
The feasibility of the idea to perform a runtime evaluation can be seen by the fact that a lot of research has been carried out on it during the last couple of years. The general idea is based on the mathematical notion of prognosability [11] , which describes the predictability of failures before they occur.
III. MODEL-DRIVEN SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT
Model-Driven Development (MDD) is a software development paradigm, which aims at raising the software development process to a more abstract level by introducing modeling languages that complement programming languages [12] .
Popular MDD approaches like Model-Driven Architecture [13] (MDA) propose a multi-tier modeling architecture with a metametamodel on top. Speaking metaphorically, this can be seen as a language to define languages. A language that is defined in such a way is called a metamodel, which is typically application specific. This metamodel can be used to create a model of a specific application. Finally, on the lowermost level, an instance of this application is actual source code. MDA uses its Meta-Object Facility to describe this hierarchy.
Apart from the modeling itself, a second concept is of great importance for MDD. This is the concept of automatic transformations between entities of the modeling hierarchy. These transformations exist in two variants: the first one are model-to-model (M2M) transformations that use a model as an input to generate an output model. The second kind are model-to-text (M2T) transformations and model-to-code (M2C) transformations, which generate source code in a traditional programming language. For this, the input model of the transformation has to be parsed and an appropriate code generation technique has to be applied, e.g. based on code templates.
The Object Management Group (OMG) is trying to setup a standard for these kind of transformations [14] , but a lot of MDD tools and methodologies are already existing in academia (e.g., openArchitectureWare, ATLAS, Fujaba, Arctis) as well as in industry (e.g., Matlab Simulink, Esterel SCADE, IBM Telelogic Rational Rhapsody). It is unlikely that they adopt a common standard in the near future.
IV. METAMODEL AND ANALYSIS ALGORITHMS
This section describes our approach for runtime reliability analysis. It tries to achieve two major design goals: We extend previous work ( [15] , [16] ) by new elements to describe dependencies between faults, to keep the additional effort for the user at a minimum. These new classes will be presented in Sec. IV-A. The second goal is to prepare the approach for future cyber-physical systems. This can be achieved by performing the reliability analysis at runtime, similar to the idea of models at runtime. Due to the fact that the computing resources of cyber-physical systems are expected to be limited, the analysis algorithms have to be lightweight. A detailed description of the according runtime environment and the used analysis algorithms is presented in Sec. IV-B.
A. Metamodel for Dependencies between Errors
The metamodel of our approach is depicted in Fig.  1 . It is based on the basic entity Fault. Fault is used to describe faults of components in the system by modeling their occurrence probability. This class forms the link to previous work, presented in [16] : the abstract class FaultyComponentBehavior can inherit all its attributes from it so that dependencies between instances of FaultyComponentBehavior can be described with ease.
Based on this class, we introduce the abstract class DependentFailure with its attributes name (for easier handling by the user), target (the fault that is triggered by the dependency), occurenceProbability (the probability that the dependency occurs) and isInstant (to describe if the triggered fault occurs instantly after the dependency occurred or if just the occurrence probability of the fault is increased by the dependency). Moreover, its interface describes one function. It has to be noted that in most applications, this function will already be existing in the system and therefore only a function pointer 1 have to be added:
• detectTarget() is a diagnostic technique that is able to detect the occurrence of the triggered fault. From this superclass, we derive one subclass to model common causes between faults: a CommonCauseFailure adds the two attributes source (the fault, which has a common cause with target) and isBidirectional (to describe if only the occurrence of source can trigger target or if also the occurrence of target can trigger source to occur. This is just a simplification to make modeling easier for the user). Moreover, it adds one function, which is most likely also already existing in the system and therefore again only a function pointer has to be added:
• detectSource() is a diagnostic technique that is able to detect the occurrence of the source fault. The class CommonCauseFailure can be used to link faults in the system model. These links can be exploited at runtime to perform various analyses. First, it is possible to follow the link in case the source fault occurs to execute the detection-function of target (see Alg. 1). In many real world examples, dependencies have to be traced in both directions, e.g., spatial closeness or manufacturing process. For these dependencies, the attribute isBidirectional has been introduced. It is very important that the more generic approach, directed dependencies, is still available to the user, because it is required in some rare situations, 1 function pointers in the sense of the C programming language e.g., dependencies that emerge from system geometry like redundant, distributed sensors. Obviously, bidirectional dependencies are far more frequent, but still unidirectional dependencies cannot be neglected.
Apart from tracing dependencies to detect failures faster, they can also be used to update the online reliability evaluation (see Alg. 2) to reason about the overall system reliability.
The separation of dependent failures and common cause failures in the metamodel is following the failure classification from Borcsok et al. [10] , presented in Sec. II.
B. Reliability Analysis at Runtime
We propose three algorithms to perform various tasks to analyze system reliability. These tasks are
• tracing of dependencies between faults • online reliability evaluation • online evaluation of hidden errors These algorithms can be configured and parameterized very easily by using information, modeled with the metamodel, presented in Sec. IV-A. This metamodel is a simple extension of the metamodel that was introduced in previous work, presented in [16] . Our approach uses code generation to perform this parameterization automatically. The proposed algorithms aim at achieving two goals:
• Faults can be detected faster by the exploitation of dependencies between them, reducing a system's failure rate.
• The overall reliability of a system can be evaluated at runtime, so in case the reliability falls below a defined threshold, safety functions can be executed. The required data structures will be presented in Sec. IV-B1, the algorithm to trace dependent faults will be introduced in Sec. IV-B2, the online reliability evaluation algorithm will be given in Sec. IV-B3 and the approach to detect hidden faults will be discussed in Sec. IV-B4.
1) Data Structures:
The data structures required at runtime to perform various analyses are depicted in Fig. 2 . They include the list of all faults that are of interest and their occurrence probability (faults) together with a set of according diagnostic techniques (faultDetectors) that are able to detect them. Moreover a set of dependencies between these faults is required. This dependencies are defined by references to the dependent source and target faults, the information if the dependency is instant and the occurrence probability of the dependency (dependencies).
The overall system state is reflected via fault configurations and therefore, one variable has to hold the currently active fault configuration (ACTIVE_FAULT_CONFIGURATION).
A fault configuration is used to describe patterns of the fault containment units (subsystems that prohibit the propagation of errors over their borders, [17] ) of overall system, e.g.
The concept of fault configurations and fault containment units has already been introduced by FTOS and can therefore be reused by our approach.
A transition table describes the resulting fault configuration, in case a fault occurs, based on the currently active fault configuration (faultConfigurationTransitions). In this table, −1, indicates that the resulting fault configuration is invalid, meaning that the system will fail.
The configuration of these data structures at system startup of the running example is visualized in Fig. 3 .
2) Tracing Dependent Faults: Whenever a fault is detected, Alg. 1 is executed. It first checks if there are other faults that may depend on the occurred one. If there are instant dependencies, then the according diagnostic techniques are executed to check if also the dependent faults occurred. Following the definition of the metamodel in Sec. IV-A, instant dependencies still have their own probability of occurrence and therefore it cannot be assumed that the dependent fault has occurred. If there are non-instant dependencies, then the occurrence probability of the dependent faults is increased accordingly to the occurrence probability of dependency.
3) Online Reliability Evaluation: The online reliability evaluation, depicted in Alg. 2, calculates the failure probability (hence 1 − reliability) of a given fault configuration fc in a recursive way.
After checking, if fc already results in a failure of the overall system, the occurrence probabilities of all faults that result in immediate failure of the overall system are summed up. For all faults that do not result in an immediate failure of the overall system, the failure probability of the fault configurations, in which they result, is calculated and added to the reliability of fc.
4) Online Evaluation of Hidden Errors:
Apart from the fact that faults may often depend on each other, another noteworthy situation can be analyzed automatically, namely the situation that an erroneous component mistakenly assumes a fault in another component. An example for this is a defective network interface that prohibits incoming messages from being processed. Typical diagnostic techniques would interpret this situation in the way that the message sender is not working properly any more, even if the actual fault is residing at the receiver's side of the communication process.
Even as the selection of the most likely fault is trivial by comparing the according occurrence probabilities, the situation changes when a component is assuming that multiple faults have occurred in other components at the same time, e.g. a broken network link that mimics the failure of multiple communication partners.
For independent faults, this should be an extreme rare case, so to minimize the probability of misjudgment, Alg. 3 can be used.
The algorithm first computes the combined occurrence probability of all occurred faults and afterwards computes the reliability of the component on which it is executed. Afterwards, these two probabilities are compared to decide, which of both situations is more likely.
V. EVALUATION
This section will show that our approach increases system safety. Moreover, it will evaluate the approach by analyzing the expressiveness of the metamodel. To show the feasibility of the approach, a theoretical analysis, based on computational complexity theory for runtime and memory consumption will be presented. Moreover it is described on an example system. In the following the operator will be used as a short form of number of ....
A. Increased Safety
To show the presented approach actually increases system safety, we analyze the failure rate λ of an exemplified system. Assuming that it is only reasonable to trace dependencies in fault tolerant systems, we analyze a TMR-system, , we calculate the failure rate of the overall system:
The benefit of the approach becomes visible, when a component, e.g., A, actually fails after t < 100 hours. The failure rate of the resulting, degraded system is
In comparison, the sporadic execution of a diagnostic technique after tracing dependent faults to determine the status of component B after the failure of A would result in the following failure rate calculation:
Simple algebra shows that λ B ∨C < λ B∨C (for t > 0) and therefore the system safety has been increased by the application of our approach.
The benefits of the two other proposed algorithms (Online Reliability Evaluation, Alg. 2, Online Evaluation of Hidden Errors, Alg. 3) are not that easy to quantify. Both of them are tools for the system developer to acquire more reliable information about the actual system state. The online reliability evaluation is a novel data source, which can be used to execute error avoidance techniques, where as the online evaluation of hidden errors increases the overall diagnostic coverage.
B. Expressiveness of the Metamodel
The selected metamodel assumes a Gauss distribution of faults. As it has been shown in Sec. II, other approaches exist, but they are suffering from problems in practice.
The second restriction of the metamodel is that all dependencies between faults have to be modeled individually, as in contrast to an approach where sets of dependencies can be modeled similar to aspects in aspect-oriented programming. The main motivation for this is that the computational effort of the various analysis techniques presented in Sec. IV-B has a superlinear increase with the number of dependencies. To achieve the goal that the reliability analysis should be executable at runtime, it is therefore important that only dependencies that are really necessary are part of an actual model. This restriction also prevents the approach from dealing with the situation that one fault depends on the occurrence of two or more independent faults. As the occurrence probability of random faults is very small in general, the combined probability of occurrence of two or more independent faults is negligibly small. Therefore this case is not handled by the approach of this paper for the sake of practical applicability.
C. Runtime
One of the advantages of our approach is its runtime efficiency. This property can be derived by analyzing the runtime of all presented algorithms. The following of dependent faults (Alg. 1) is executed in:
The online reliability analysis (Alg. 2) seems to be quite expensive, regarding computational complexity because it relies on recursion. However, the number of recursive calls is limited by the number of faults that a system can tolerate. In practice, this number is typically just one in many uses cases because of existing safe states: after this one error occurred, the system is transferred to the safe state and its user is requested to perform maintenance actions . Therefore, its runtime complexity is:
O( f aultConf igurations × dependencies)
As it has been described in Sec. IV-A, fault configurations are typically based on a very coarse grained separation of the system, so their number will also be quite limited in many cases. Finally the analysis of hidden faults (Alg. 3) is performed in: O( f aults)
D. Memory
The runtime efficiency of our approach assumes a decent amount of available memory. For every interesting fault, its occurrence probability and a pointer to the according detector function has to be saved, consuming ( f aults * (int + double)) variables. Moreover for every dependency, two pointers to faults, a boolean value isInstant and the occurrence probability has to be saved in dependencies * (2 * int+bool +double)) variables. The table, describing the transitions between fault configurations, requires an integer value for every combination of faults and fault configurations ( f aults * f aultConf igurations * int). However, this table will be probably only sparsely filled, so run-length encoding can be applied to reduce the required memory. Finally, for every fault mask, a pointer to a fault configuration and the according occurrence probability has to be stored( f aultM asks * (int + double)).
E. Evaluation of an Example System
We use a production line demonstrator as part of the evaluation of our approach. The functional part of the system is a modular production system (MPS) by Festo 2 , which will be called FestoMPS throughout the paper. Our small example consists out of two programmable logic controllers (PLCs), which exchange workpieces via conveyor belts and perform various processing steps on them.
Since automation systems can be safety-critical, they can typically be extended by add-ons, which monitor the functionality of the overall system and are able to avoid hazardous situations as the consequence of a fault. In case a fault is detected, they execute proper safety functions. We developed such an add-on ourselves. Our safe-off add-on monitors the internal state of the PLC and in case the PLC performs an unexpected state transition, a safety function is executed that turns the PLC off. The safe-off add-on is connected to the PLC via Ethernet and it consists of three microcontroller units, which are executed in a triple modular redundant way, to assure their functional safety. The safety function was implemented on separate hardware (the microcontroller units, not the PLCs) to emphasize its independence from the basic system functionality.
In this example system, four faults were modeled, which is visualized in Fig. 4 . Two RAM faults (one in ECU 1, one in ECU 2) that may depend on each other because of a hypothesized spatial closeness of the two ECUs. This dependency is obviously instant and bidirectional. Moreover two dependent CPU faults were added (one in ECU 2, one in ECU 3) to the system, due to the two CPUs being hypothetically built by the same manufacturer. This dependency is also bidirectional, but not instant.
The system is separated in three fault containment units, one for each ECU, resulting in the fault configurations being triples. As the system is considered safe only as long as two of the three ECUs are working properly, 5 fault configuration are defined: all correct, ECU1 erroneous, ECU2 erroneous, ECU3 erroneous and system erroneous.
The runtime of the proposed algorithms for this system is 2 iterations (Alg. 1, Following Dependent Faults), 10 iterations (Alg. 2, Online Reliability Evaluation) and 4 iterations (Alg. 3, Online Evaluation of Hidden Errors). The runtime system requires 78 bytes for saving 2 boolean variables, 6 double variables and 28 integer variables. 
